Thomas Hegghammer: Jihad in Saudi Arabia- Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979
This book about the evolution of jihadism in Saudi Arabia represents social science at its best.
Hegghammer sets out to explain mobilization for Islamic activism in its jihadist variant in Saudi Arabia. The book applies a threefold analytical approach, distinguishing between macro-, meso and micro-level mechanisms that drove the development of jihadism in Saudi Arabia. The macro-level comprises international developments, Saudi domestic politics and the development of the Jihadist ideational landscape. At the meso-level, Hegghammer focuses on jihadist entrepreneurs and their strategies for mobilization. Finally, in his investigation of the micro-level drivers of jihadist mobilization, Hegghammer examines individual combatant's socio-economic profiles and motivations.The three levels of analysis are, in turn, applied to the three stages of Saudi jihadism: A first phase from mid-1980s to mid-1990s saw the emergence of classical jihadism, a doctrine which developed out of "liberation" struggles in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya and argued that all Muslims had to fight against non-Muslim invaders of Muslim territory. A second phase saw the emergence of global jihadism under Bin Laden, who, argued for out of area mass casualty attacks against non-Muslim powers. In the third phase, Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) emerged in order to wage war against the Western presence in Saudi Arabia.
Classicial Jihadism
A first chapter investigates the macro-level mechanisms behind the spread of classical jihadism. A central factor was the rise of Pan-Islamism, i.e. the idea of Muslims as one people. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi King Faisal promoted pan-Islamism in an attempt to shore up the domestic legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy during a times of Iranian challenge and sinking oil prices. The Muslim World League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, both organizations created as Saudi initiatives, assumed central roles in furthering the pan-Islamic cause. Pan-Islamism also increasingly assumed a security dimension in the late 70s and 80s, triggered by the increase in conflicts in Muslim countries.
Chapter 2 moves to the meso level of classical jihadism. Hegghammer points to the importance of Abdallah Azzam's reformulation of Jihadist doctrine, which, based on the case of Afghanistan, redefined jihad in territorial struggles against non-Muslim invaders as a collective duty for all Muslims. During this period, an organizational blueprint to facilitate jihadism was developed in Afghanistan: The Services Bureau provided a separate infrastructure for Arab fighters and systematically worked with the media and through Muslim charities. A similar formula was later applied in Bosnia and Chechnya.
Chapter 3 investigates the micro dimension of classical jihadism, i.e. the question of who got recruited for what reason to join the jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Chechnya. Hegghammer's central finding is that neither socio-economic indicators nor ideology were good predictors for why individuals decided to join, but rather friendship, kinship ties and the social experience of joining jihad.
Global Jihadism
Chapter 4 investigates the opportunity structure for global jihadism between 1996 and 2001. A central precursor for the radicalization of the Saudi Islamist scene was the oppression of the Sahwa movement in the early 1990s. The Sahwa is a non-violent reformist movement merging Wahhabist ideology with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi state oppression of the Sahwa led to the loss of a part of the clergy which could rein in the more radical jihadist elements, The vacuum was partially filled by the al-Shu'yabi school of clerics, who increasingly provided Wahhabi religious legitimacy for jihadist activism. Moreover, repression of the Sahwa also convinced Jihadists of the futility of non-violent protest, and ultimately resulted in the 1995 Ryadh bombing against US military contractors. The Saudi state enhanced, but also inconsistent repression, which followed the attack only furthered the radicalization of a generation of militants. All this took place against the opportunity structure offered by international conflicts in Kosovo, Cechnya, the Palestinian intifada, and increasing tensions between the Taliban and the West.
Chapter 5 examines the meso-level of Al Quaida's development in Saudi Arabia. The doctrine of global jihadism as formulated by Osama Bin Laden foresaw global warfare against the "far enemy" (the United States). Hegghammer argues that in spite of this doctrine being much more controversial than classical jihadism, Bin Laden still managed to aquire military capabilities out of proportion to his actual support base in Saudi Arabia. The central factor were safe havens in Afghanistan, allowing Al Quaida to provide its recruits professional military training.
Turning to the micro-level once more, Hegghammer examines in Chapter 6 the motivations among Saudis that joined the jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Recruitment in Saudi Arabia at that time had to be done mostly underground, which increased the importance of gatekeepers, individuals in Saudi Arabia who could provide a link to Al Qaida in Afghanistan. This function was taken over by private recruiters, religious study groups, and sheiks. Individual motives for joining during this period remained diverse, ranging from religious reasons to the quest for adventure.
Post 9/11 Jihadism.
Chapter 7 details the macro-level mechanisms which drove the mobilization and recruitment for Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula. After the 09/ 11 attacks, pan-Islamist sentiment reached new heights, motivated by perceived symbols of Muslim suffering in Afghanistan, Yemen and Guantanamo. The al-Shu'yabi school of clerics (including notably Nasir al-Fahd and al-Khudayir) also proved to be a central factor in recruitment and mobilization for AQAP. Those clerics did so directly, by religiously justifying the killing of Westerners in Saudi Arabia and of Saudi Security Forces, but also indirectly, by driving the Saudi Security Forces to adopt a more confrontational stance against AQAP.
Chapter 8 investigates the meso or organizational level.of AQAP activities in Saudi Arabia after 2001. For AQ, having been evicted from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia became more attractive as a theater of operations and less useful as a source of money and recruits. Bin Laden thus saw the time to have come to begin the campaign against the foreign presence in Saudi Arabia, sending two major terrorist networks into action. While the al-Nashiri network was largely dismantled by Saudi counter-terrorism efforts, the al-Ayeri network was able to engage in a strategy of systematic organization-building. Hegghammer describes the network's information and propaganda efforts, an infrastructure for recruitment, a training infrastructure, weapons, money and safe houses. AQAP, or mostly the al-Ayeri network, finally launched its campaign in spring 2013.
Chapter 9 investigates the biographies of people involved in the AQAP campaign between 2002 and 2006, taking the analysis once more to the micro-level of terrorist recruitment. A clear common denominator of most Saudi jihadis during this period was the shared Afghan experience which also explained their problems to reintegrate into Saudi society. As for their motivations for joining, anti-Americanism played a more important role than for previous generations of Jihadists, but comradeship, revenge and fear of security forces also figured prominently. Hegghammer outlines three mechanisms which brought Saudis into AQAP: persuasion- AQAP activists persuading others to join in, incrimination- people becoming unknowingly incriminated through their association with AQAP members- and protection- people joining in search of protection from the police.
Chapter 10 deals with the petering out of the AQAP campaign after 2010, essentially identifying 3 different factors: the effectiveness of Saudi counter-terrorism, the lack of popular support, and the popular appeal of joining a classical jihad in Iraq rather than fighting in the Saudi homeland. Regarding Saudi counter-terrorism, Hegghammer describes the complete overhaul of the Saudi counter-terrorism apparatus, the circumscription of AQAP's resources, the creation of exit options for militants, and a religious propaganda campaign directed at the hearts and minds of the Saudi Islamist community.
Overall, area studies meets social science at its best. Hegghammer manages to combine a rigorous conceptual framework with well-researched evidence on jihadism in the Arab peninsula, based on primary sources. Plus, the whole book at points almost reads like a thriller. Highly recommended.
This book about the evolution of jihadism in Saudi Arabia represents social science at its best.
Hegghammer sets out to explain mobilization for Islamic activism in its jihadist variant in Saudi Arabia. The book applies a threefold analytical approach, distinguishing between macro-, meso and micro-level mechanisms that drove the development of jihadism in Saudi Arabia. The macro-level comprises international developments, Saudi domestic politics and the development of the Jihadist ideational landscape. At the meso-level, Hegghammer focuses on jihadist entrepreneurs and their strategies for mobilization. Finally, in his investigation of the micro-level drivers of jihadist mobilization, Hegghammer examines individual combatant's socio-economic profiles and motivations.The three levels of analysis are, in turn, applied to the three stages of Saudi jihadism: A first phase from mid-1980s to mid-1990s saw the emergence of classical jihadism, a doctrine which developed out of "liberation" struggles in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya and argued that all Muslims had to fight against non-Muslim invaders of Muslim territory. A second phase saw the emergence of global jihadism under Bin Laden, who, argued for out of area mass casualty attacks against non-Muslim powers. In the third phase, Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) emerged in order to wage war against the Western presence in Saudi Arabia.
Classicial Jihadism
A first chapter investigates the macro-level mechanisms behind the spread of classical jihadism. A central factor was the rise of Pan-Islamism, i.e. the idea of Muslims as one people. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi King Faisal promoted pan-Islamism in an attempt to shore up the domestic legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy during a times of Iranian challenge and sinking oil prices. The Muslim World League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, both organizations created as Saudi initiatives, assumed central roles in furthering the pan-Islamic cause. Pan-Islamism also increasingly assumed a security dimension in the late 70s and 80s, triggered by the increase in conflicts in Muslim countries.
Chapter 2 moves to the meso level of classical jihadism. Hegghammer points to the importance of Abdallah Azzam's reformulation of Jihadist doctrine, which, based on the case of Afghanistan, redefined jihad in territorial struggles against non-Muslim invaders as a collective duty for all Muslims. During this period, an organizational blueprint to facilitate jihadism was developed in Afghanistan: The Services Bureau provided a separate infrastructure for Arab fighters and systematically worked with the media and through Muslim charities. A similar formula was later applied in Bosnia and Chechnya.
Chapter 3 investigates the micro dimension of classical jihadism, i.e. the question of who got recruited for what reason to join the jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Chechnya. Hegghammer's central finding is that neither socio-economic indicators nor ideology were good predictors for why individuals decided to join, but rather friendship, kinship ties and the social experience of joining jihad.
Global Jihadism
Chapter 4 investigates the opportunity structure for global jihadism between 1996 and 2001. A central precursor for the radicalization of the Saudi Islamist scene was the oppression of the Sahwa movement in the early 1990s. The Sahwa is a non-violent reformist movement merging Wahhabist ideology with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi state oppression of the Sahwa led to the loss of a part of the clergy which could rein in the more radical jihadist elements, The vacuum was partially filled by the al-Shu'yabi school of clerics, who increasingly provided Wahhabi religious legitimacy for jihadist activism. Moreover, repression of the Sahwa also convinced Jihadists of the futility of non-violent protest, and ultimately resulted in the 1995 Ryadh bombing against US military contractors. The Saudi state enhanced, but also inconsistent repression, which followed the attack only furthered the radicalization of a generation of militants. All this took place against the opportunity structure offered by international conflicts in Kosovo, Cechnya, the Palestinian intifada, and increasing tensions between the Taliban and the West.
Chapter 5 examines the meso-level of Al Quaida's development in Saudi Arabia. The doctrine of global jihadism as formulated by Osama Bin Laden foresaw global warfare against the "far enemy" (the United States). Hegghammer argues that in spite of this doctrine being much more controversial than classical jihadism, Bin Laden still managed to aquire military capabilities out of proportion to his actual support base in Saudi Arabia. The central factor were safe havens in Afghanistan, allowing Al Quaida to provide its recruits professional military training.
Turning to the micro-level once more, Hegghammer examines in Chapter 6 the motivations among Saudis that joined the jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Recruitment in Saudi Arabia at that time had to be done mostly underground, which increased the importance of gatekeepers, individuals in Saudi Arabia who could provide a link to Al Qaida in Afghanistan. This function was taken over by private recruiters, religious study groups, and sheiks. Individual motives for joining during this period remained diverse, ranging from religious reasons to the quest for adventure.
Post 9/11 Jihadism.
Chapter 7 details the macro-level mechanisms which drove the mobilization and recruitment for Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula. After the 09/ 11 attacks, pan-Islamist sentiment reached new heights, motivated by perceived symbols of Muslim suffering in Afghanistan, Yemen and Guantanamo. The al-Shu'yabi school of clerics (including notably Nasir al-Fahd and al-Khudayir) also proved to be a central factor in recruitment and mobilization for AQAP. Those clerics did so directly, by religiously justifying the killing of Westerners in Saudi Arabia and of Saudi Security Forces, but also indirectly, by driving the Saudi Security Forces to adopt a more confrontational stance against AQAP.
Chapter 8 investigates the meso or organizational level.of AQAP activities in Saudi Arabia after 2001. For AQ, having been evicted from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia became more attractive as a theater of operations and less useful as a source of money and recruits. Bin Laden thus saw the time to have come to begin the campaign against the foreign presence in Saudi Arabia, sending two major terrorist networks into action. While the al-Nashiri network was largely dismantled by Saudi counter-terrorism efforts, the al-Ayeri network was able to engage in a strategy of systematic organization-building. Hegghammer describes the network's information and propaganda efforts, an infrastructure for recruitment, a training infrastructure, weapons, money and safe houses. AQAP, or mostly the al-Ayeri network, finally launched its campaign in spring 2013.
Chapter 9 investigates the biographies of people involved in the AQAP campaign between 2002 and 2006, taking the analysis once more to the micro-level of terrorist recruitment. A clear common denominator of most Saudi jihadis during this period was the shared Afghan experience which also explained their problems to reintegrate into Saudi society. As for their motivations for joining, anti-Americanism played a more important role than for previous generations of Jihadists, but comradeship, revenge and fear of security forces also figured prominently. Hegghammer outlines three mechanisms which brought Saudis into AQAP: persuasion- AQAP activists persuading others to join in, incrimination- people becoming unknowingly incriminated through their association with AQAP members- and protection- people joining in search of protection from the police.
Chapter 10 deals with the petering out of the AQAP campaign after 2010, essentially identifying 3 different factors: the effectiveness of Saudi counter-terrorism, the lack of popular support, and the popular appeal of joining a classical jihad in Iraq rather than fighting in the Saudi homeland. Regarding Saudi counter-terrorism, Hegghammer describes the complete overhaul of the Saudi counter-terrorism apparatus, the circumscription of AQAP's resources, the creation of exit options for militants, and a religious propaganda campaign directed at the hearts and minds of the Saudi Islamist community.
Overall, area studies meets social science at its best. Hegghammer manages to combine a rigorous conceptual framework with well-researched evidence on jihadism in the Arab peninsula, based on primary sources. Plus, the whole book at points almost reads like a thriller. Highly recommended.
