Dancing Queen

Zadie Smith: Swing Time

Another coming off age story, describing paths towards success, failure and something in-between in life.

Zadie Smith follows the lives of two colored girls from their childhood days to them being middle-aged women. Tracey and an unnamed narrator grow up in social housing in a disadvantaged quarter of London. Their childhood and teenage days are marked by the two girls' love for dance and their ambitions to become dancers. Tracey, however, seems significantly more gifted than the narrator when it comes to dancing.

While the two girls grow up in the same neighborhood with similar dreams, their social surroundings and later paths in life very much differ. The narrator's mother is a community activist who rises to become a member of parliament. Her daughter finds a job in music television and ultimately as the personal assistant of an Australian pop star, Aimee (seemingly modeled on Madonna). A significant part of the story is set in Africa, in a country resembling Gambia , where Aimee adopts a child and attempts to build a school in a village. Both Aimee and the narrator fall in love with the same man, Lamin, a local teacher in the African village, which ultimately leads to them falling out with each other.

The depiction of the later life of Tracey, on the other hand, is told through the lens of the increasingly sporadic encounters the narrator has with her.  She becomes a dancer and manages to score roles in various musicals, but never manages to escape the environment she grew up in or establish herself professionally. A single mother, Tracey  projects her personal failure on the narrator's mother, harassing her through a continuous series of hateful e-mails.  The story implies that in the end Tracey and the narrator may manage to reestablish their relationship over the death of the narrator's mother.

A story of two girls growing up dreaming to become dancers is not necessarily the kind of story-line which immediately caught my interest.  The book is also not as epic as Elena Ferrante's take on female friendship. Some of the background characters such as pop-star Aimee also felt kind of wooden. Still, in spite of those weaknesses, this is an absolutely captivating book. Smith's great strength  seems to me her ability to portray different socio-cultural milieus in a graphic and utterly convincing manner, be it a 1980s disadvantaged neighborhood in London or a village in rural Eastern Africa. Overall, recommended.

Random pop-cultural reference:
Ballet...

Favorite quotes:
"As a fact it was in my mind at the same time absolutely true and obviously untrue, and perhaps only children are able to accommodate double-faced facts like these." (the narrator about Tracey's claim that her father was a background dancer for Michael Jackson)

"A deep anxiety about being told off- for who they were, for what they had or hadn't done, and now for the deeds of their children- this fear never really left our mothers, many of whom had become our mothers when they were not much more than children themselves. And so 'Parents' Evening' was in their minds not so far from 'detention'".

"And all the labor she put into it, all the physical exercise, all the deliberate blindness, the innocence cultivated, the spiritual epiphanies she was able somehow to experience spontaneously, the very many ways she fell in and out of love, like a teenager- all of this came to seem to me effectively a form of energy in itself, a force capable of creating a dilation in time, as if she really were moving at the speed of light..." (the narrator about Aimee)

"If London was unreal, if New York was unreal, they were powerful stage shows: as soon as we were back inside them they not only seemed real but the only possible reality, and decisions made about the village from these locations always seemed to have a certain plausibility while we were making them, and only later, when one or other of us arrived back here, and crossed this river, did the potential absurdity of whatever it was become clear." (about making decisions about a development project from abroad)

"Only a few years earlier a break-up like this would have been only a minor setback to Aimee ...But I had noticed a change in her, her personal armor was no longer what it once was. Leaving and being left- these operations now affected her far more deeply, they were no longer water off a duck's back to her, she was actually wounded..."

"All in all the Illuminated Academy for Girls was not the shining, radically new , unprecedented  incubator-of-the-future ... It was the 'Loomy Academy', as people called it locally, where many small but interesting things were happening, every day, which were then argued over and debated at the end of each week, in the village meetings, which led to further adaptations and changes..." (about the school Aimee built)

"Anyway, when somebody you care about gets ill, all the other business ... it just goes." (about the sickness of the narrator's mother)

So the People Will

Jan-Werner Müller: What is Populism?

A short and concise book on populism. Müller defines populism, discusses how populists govern, and lays out ways to confront populism. Relevant and enjoyable.

In a first chapter, Müller discusses how to best define populism, settling on a definition based on the political discourse employed by populists. He rejects to describe populism based on the quality of policies- it is often impossible to define what a good policy is- the socio-economic profile of voters- it is not only the economically disadvantaged who vote for populist parties- psychological characteristics of supporters- it is too easy to simply disqualify the supporters of populist parties as angry or authoritarian- or the self-description of parties as populist- the use of the label has varied widely over the years. Instead, Müllers employs features of populist discourse to define the phenomenon. Populists resort to a moralistic imagination of politics which puts a morally pure and unified people against corrupt elites. Populism is thus both anti-elitist and anti-pluralist. According to populist discourse, a singular popular will exists and can be discerned (1). It is only due to the corrupt elites who are in power that the popular will is not implemented. Populist leaders, on the contrary, have a superior ability to identify what the people want and implement their popular will.

In the second chapter, Müller investigates how populists govern once they are in power. He positions himself against the hypothesis that populist governance is necessarily bound to fail. Populist statecraft usually has three hallmarks: the colonialization of the state; mass clientelism, and the repression of civil society. Victor Orban's Fidesz Party in Hungary or Jaroslw Kaczynsky's Law and Order Party in Poland have, once in power, undertaken large scale efforts to install their followers in the media, the civil service and the judiciary. Mass clientelism means that populist leaders distribute material and immaterial favors to their followers. Finally, populists in power move against civil society, and often try to label NGOs as "foreign agents" opposed to the people. When in power, many populist leaders have also aimed for changes in their countries' constitutions. Müller uses the example of the Hungarian fundamental law- entered into force in 2012- to illustrate populist constitution-making. The constitution enshrines very specific policy preferences and the political opposition was largely excluded from the process of passing and drafting it. Other hallmarks of populist constitution are the strengthening of the executive, which usually goes hand in hand with the weakening of the other powers, particularly the judiciary. As seen in Venezuela, populist constitutions often set the ground for permanent political conflict, as the political opposition may, in spite of an uneven playing field, still win elections or gain representation. Müller also argues against the use of the term "illiberal democracy" for populist regimes, arguing that populism moves against some of the very fundamentals of democracy, such as freedom of speech. 

In the final chapter, Müller lays out his ideas on how to engage populists. He argues against refusing to engage them and in favor of taking the claim that parts of the population are not politically represented seriously. Müller joins others in constating a crisis of political representation. First, a new political cleavage has emerged, putting citizens favoring economic and cultural openness against those opposing it. Second, constitutions in Western Europe still mostly stem from the post-war period. In response to the experiences made with fascism earlier on, polities were crafted with the goal to "lock in" a commitment to liberal democracy. Parliamentary sovereignty was restricted and un-elected bodies such as constitutional courts, central banks, or the bodies of the newly created European Community were empowered. 

Overall an important, timely and very readable book on populism. Müller provides a clear definition of a concept which is as slippery as it is far-spread and important in current political discourse. His arguments come in handy for confronting the partisans of the populist parties which have found themselves strengthened throughout much of the Western world and beyond. Müller also lays the groundwork for a more in-depth empirical analysis of populism. As short and concise as this book is, its mere 100 pages, mostly located in the realm of political theory, unfortunately do not allow for the analysis of important issues, particularly the variety of real-world "populisms". Future empirical work could for instance investigate how populist rule differs between polities on different continents and at different stages of economic development.

(1) Müller contrasts the positions of early 20th century legal philosophers Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen on whether a popular will exists. Kelsen prominently argued that there is no such thing as a popular will, labelling it a "metapolitical illusion", as only electoral results are empirically verifiable. Carl Schmitt, on the contrary, gave an almost mythical notion of the popular will an important place in his work.

"Since I grew tired of the chase and search, I learned to find"

Eric Schmidt and Jonathan Rosenberg: How Google Works- The Rules for Success in the Internet Century

Schmidt and Rosenberg describe how product excellence, the key to corporate success in the internet age, can be furthered through a company's culture, strategy, recruitment, decision-making, communication, and approach to innovation.

The Background: The costs of IT-related factors of production have declined significantly over the past decades. The internet has drastically lowered the costs of information; mobile devices have made connectivity affordable to many more people; and cloud computing allows for  cheaply available computing power. As a result, consumers are nowadays better informed than ever before and the costs of experimenting to develop new products have drastically decreased for companies. This, in turn, means that business success is more dependent on product excellence than in the past.

Culture:  The founders of Google invested significant time and effort to formulate their company's culture. Slogans like "don't be evil" have become widely known. Schmidt and Rosenberg introduce less known aspects of Google's corporate culture, too. Those include messy and crowded office spaces, decision-making based on data, treating being overworked as part of a life-style, and giving employees the chance to manage their time independently. Schmidt and Rosenberg also discuss organizational solutions appropriate for a company in the internet age. While there is no perfect organizational form, Google has found it useful to have a minimum of 7 employees reporting to a manager to keep hierarchies flat. Also, Google maintained a functional organization rather than organizing along product lines to prevent the emergence of organizational silos.

Strategy: Talking about strategy, Schmidt and Rosenberg emphasize three points: betting on technical insights; optimizing for scale, and defaulting to openly accessible solutions. Instead of being driven by market research, Google attempts to come up with new technical insights which significantly reduce the costs of  a product and enhance functionality. Google also aimed for quick and global growth. The way to achieving this kind of growth in the internet age is to create and grow platforms (such as youtube or amazon), i.e. "a set of products and services that bring together groups of users and providers to form multi-sided markets." Drawing upon the work of economist Ronald Coase, the authors argue that in the internet age, with transaction costs having declined significantly, there is less  need for large hierarchical companies. Companies instead work with a whole network of partners and customers via platforms which allow them to interact to their mutual benefit. Finally, Google has also been founded on the idea of defaulting to open when it comes to the platforms it offers, using open software and allowing users to easily enter and exit its platforms. Ultimately, being open makes a platform more competitive and offer customers more value.

Talent: Schmidt and Rosenberg also detail how google has managed to attract its immensely talented staff. They argue, based on work by psychologist Carol Dweck, that google aims to hire staff with a "growth mindset". People with a growth mindset do not accept the notion that their qualities are carved in stone, but rather believe that they can permanently adapt and change. Google's hiring decisions are also strongly data-driven: data on previous hiring decisions have for instance been used to determine the optimum number interviews (four) to identify suited candidates.

Decisions: In this chapter, Schmidt and Rosenberg  argue in favor of a consensus-based decision-making model which is solution-oriented and promotes inclusion, cooperation and equality. Based on their conviction that virtually all business processes are quantifiable, especially in the internet age, the authors also make the case for data-based decision-making. Finally, Schmidt and Rosenberg promote the idea that CEOs should only have to make only few decisions and that daily meetings should be held in the run up to important decisions.

Communications: Drawing upon Google's experience, Schmidt and Rosenberg point to the need to have the flow of information maximized throughout a company. Google's philosophy to "default to open" also holds in the company's internal and external communications. Managers also need to access information about what is going on at the working level. To further open and honest communication throughout the hierarchy, google has introduced various fora, such as company-wide meetings,  .

Innovation: Contrasting Apple and Google, Schmidt and Rosenberg note how different approaches to innovation can be: Apple's operating system for its i-phones (iOS) is closed, with Apple maintaining complete control over for instance the permissible applications. Google's android system, on the contrary, is an open platform, with anyone able to create and sell applications for it.
Google's approach to innovation asks for three criteria to be met for the company to pursue an innovative idea: it must address a big challenge or opportunity which affects a large share of the world's population; the proposed solution must be radically different from anything done in the past; and the breakthrough technology enabling the envisaged solution must be available soon. Schmidt and Rosenberg also recommend for innovation to be user-centric; to focus on big ideas, which means it is better to develop one innovative product rather than a series of mediocre ones, and, to not spend too much time on perfecting a product, but instead ship it and improve at a later stage. Google also found it useful to have about 70% of the company's efforts and ressources focused on its core business, 20% on emerging products which have already shown some success, and the remaining 10% on completely new products. In an attempt to enhance "innovativeness", google employees 20% of their time to any project of their own choosing.

Overall, an informative and readable book. Of course, it sometimes comes of as a bit of a google marketing ploy. At the same time, Google has been one, if not the company defining the internet age. Also, while some of the recommendations, such as the call for data-based decision-making, might seem trivial at first, many organizations, both in the private and public sectors, are quite far from implementing them.

Random pop cultural reference:
Product placement at its worst, but it is a kind of cool movie... 

Make America Great Again

Robert Penn Warren: All the King's Men

A truly "great American novel" offering fascinating insights into the populist streak which has always been prominent in American politics. Pulitzer winner 1947 and adapted for the big screen two times.

Willie Stark is a man of humble background who becomes governor in the United States' South during the 1930s. Stark's story is told through the eyes of Jack Burden, a journalist and former student of history who becomes Stark's personal aide. Burden's relationship with Stark begins when he is covering Stark's first, unsuccessful, run for governor, when Stark takes a populist turn. He is finally elected governor of his state four years later. 
During his tenure as governor, Stark proves capable of mobilizing the masses, portraying himself as an outsider faced with a hostile political establishment. The "boss", as he is referred to by his allies, also does not refrain from blackmailing political rivals. He tasks Burden to dig up some dirt against the well-respected Judge Irwin. Irwin had been a mentor for Burden since his childhood and is later revealed to be Burden's father. Under the pressure of being confronted with a misdeed from decades ago, Irwin ultimately commits suicide. Stark's tenure is, however, not only marked by the dark arts of politics, but also by him introducing social welfare policies. His hallmark project is a hospital accessible to the general public free of charge.
Other narrative strands are dedicated to Stark's family and affairs. Willie Stark's son Tom becomes a prominent college football player, but also a political burden for his father due to his hard partying. He ends up paralyzed after a sports accident and dies soon afterwards. Willie Stark also has countless affairs. One is with his personal aide and political strategist Sadie Burke. Disfigured by the small pox disease she had contracted as a child, Sadie proves instrumental to Stark's rise and remains steadfastly loyal to him. Stark also begins a relationship with Anne Stanton, daughter of a former state governor. Anne and Jack Burden had been a couple in their youth and he continues to have feelings for her. When Burden figures out about the affair, he sets off for a journey across the U.S. to California.  Later on, Anne Stanton's brother Adam is also informed about his sister's affair. Adam, an integer man who, against his original hesitation has agreed to lead Willie Stark's hospital, kills Stark and gets himself killed in the process.

I was absolutely captivated by the book. This is all the more astonishing, given that I am not necessarily a fan of some of the narrative techniques and mythological themes featured. The story-telling, all from Jack Burden's perspective, occasionally borders on stream of consciousness techniques. Also, in a clear nod to the Odipus myth, Jack Burden inadvertently kills Judge Irwin who later turns out to be his father. Still, I loved the description of the mechanics of politics in a U.S state in the 1930s. They reminded me of, say Boardwalk Empire, House of Cards and some other favorite TV-series of mine. The way Willie Stark politically uses anti-elite sentiments, especially among the rural masses, also conveys a lesson or two about current U.S. politics. Stark himself, based on Louisiana Governor and U.S. Senator Huey Long, is an absolutely fascinating character. Darren convincingly portrays Stark in all his ambiguity, his populism and dirty political tricks, but also his almost touching commitment to improving the lot of the poor.

Random pop-cultural reference:
Bain. And Trump. And Bain. 

Favorite quotes:
"What you don't know ain't hurt you, for it ain't real. They called that Idealism in that book I had when I was in college, and after I got hold of that principle I became an idealist. I was a brass-bound Idealist in those days. If you are an Idealist it does not matter what you do or what goes on around you because it isn't real anyway." (Jack Burden)

"I have a speech here ... It is a speech about what this state needs. But there is no use telling you what this state needs. You are the state. You know what you need. Look at your pants. Have they got holes in the knee. Listen to your belly. Did it ever rumble for emptiness?" (Willie Stark turning to populism)

"I would ... get to town about midnight and go up to my hotel room where nothing was mine and nothing knew my name and nothing had a thing to say to me about anything that had ever happened."

"a person who you could tell had a deep inner certitude of self which comes from all of being one piece, of not being shreds and patches and old cogwheels held together with pieces of rusty barbed wire and spit and bits of string, like most of us." (Jack Burden about Anne Stanton)

"For nothing is lost, nothing is ever lost. There is always the clue, the cancelled check, the smear of lipstick, the footprint in the canna bed, the condom on the park path, the baby shoes dipped in bronze, the taint in the blood stream. And all times are one time, and all those dead in the past never lived before our definition gives them life, and out of the shadow their lives implore us. This is what all of us historical researchers believe." (Jack Burden about his work)

"Well, I'm not going to buy him, I'm going to bust him. I have bought too many sons of bitches already. Bust'em and they will stay busted, but buy them and you can't tell how long they will stay bought."  (Willie Stark about a political rival)

"That was why I had got into my car and headed west, because when you don't like it where you are, you always go west. We have always gone west." (Jack Burden about his trip to the West)

"For it is a tradition that a man, when he has received a great shock, heads for a bar, puts his foot on the rail, orders five straight whiskeys in a row, downs them one after another while he stares with white uncomprehending eyes at the white, tortured face in the mirror opposite him, and then engages the bartender in a sardonic conversation about life."

"Then afterward you are sure that when you meet again, the gay companion will give you the old gaiety, the brilliant stranger will stir your mind from its torpor, the sympathetic friend will solace you with teh old communion of spirit. But something happens, or almost always happens, to the gaiety, the brilliance, the communion. You remember the individual words from the old language you spoke together, but you have forgotten the grammar. You remember the steps of the dance, but the music isn't playing anymore. So there you are." (Jack Burden about his last encounter with Anne Stanton)

"Maybe that is the only way you can tell that a certain piece of knowledge is worth anything: it has cost some blood."

Video killed the radio-star

P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman: Cybersecurity and cyberwar: what everyone needs to know

A great primer in question-answer format. Highly informative for somebody like me who knew next to nothing about cyberspace and its implications for international security. 

How it all works

The first part of the book provides an understanding of the basic elements of cyber-security. Singer and Friedman define cyberspace as the realm of computer networks in which information is stored, shared and communicated. The authors offer short explanations of the internet's history, how it works and how it is being governed.

The internet. The feature of the internet which made it a "revolutionary" communication technology was that it is "packet"- rather than circuit-switched. While communication technologies based on circuit switching simply send all the data comprising a message at once, packet switching means that data flows are broken down into individual components (the so-called packets). The packets then bounce through the internet in a decentralized manner before being re-assembled at the message's designated end point. Like that, bandwidth can be saved as individual messages no longer require a dedicated circuit.  In the decades since the first advent of the internet in the late 1960s, a variety of further technological breakthroughs shaped the internet as we know it today. Common transmission protocols (Internet Protocol, abbreviated as IP) allowed to link different networks; e-mail enabled person-to-person communication; modems made it possible that phone lines be used in communicating with other computers; and the hypertext transfer protocol (http) allowed for the presentation of information linked in different computer documents.

Based on this technological survey, Singer and Friedman offer an accessible overview of how the internet actually works. At a very basic level, the internet is all about getting information from a website hosted by one computer to the computer from which a user queried the information in question. This means first of all that the location of the information a user desires must be found. Here, IP numbers come into play. IP numbers designate specific websites; each IP number is, through the domain name system (DNS), linked to a website with a given name. Moreover, the requested information must not only be found, but also needs to get from one computer to another. This process functions via three different layers. In the so-called application layer, the user sends a command in http asking for certain content. The transport layer then breaks down this information request into different packets. Finally, the network layer moves those packets through the internet, before the aforementioned transport layer reassembles them again. As for the question of how packets get across the internet, Singer and Friedman explain that the internet should be seen as a series of autonomous systems, run by different internet service providers. Each of those internet service providers hosts a number of IP addresses. Finding an IP address which contains the desired information thus means finding the relevant autonomous system. In a kind of trial and error process, various internet service providers reroute packets closer and closer to the to system which contains the intended IP address.

Internet governance. The first part of the book also offers interesting insights into the internet's governance structure . Notably, states currently do not play a major role in this governance structure. To give an example, the organization responsible for the distribution of IP addresses- the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names or Numbers (ICANN)- is registered in California as a non-profit organization. The ICANN hosts a variety of advisory committees, to include committees representing national governments, but also internet service providers.

Defining cyber security. Singer and Friedmann define cyber security as encompassing the four dimensions of confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience. Confidentiality refers to the privacy of data on a system. Integrity means that users can trust that their data and systems have not been improperly altered. The authors give the stuxnet virus as an example of an integrity attack par excellence. The virus altered the way Iranian centrifuges meant to enrich uranium were working without the Iranian engineers becoming aware in the first place. Availability refers to the ability to use systems and data as expected. Finally resilience designates the ability to avoid critical failure in the face of security threats.

Cyber threats. Singer and Friedman also provide an overview of different cyber threats. First, a variety of threats fall under the category of social engineering, which targets human users. Internet users are manipulated into revealing confidential information to cyber attackers. Phishing e-mails for instance look like e-mails received from an official and trusted source, but attempt to lure the recipient into actions in support of the attacker, such as providing their login credentials.  Advanced persistent threats are probably the most advanced form of a "socially engineered" cyber threat. They bring together teams of specialists, who do systematic surveillance of a target, before intruding into a computer system and attempting to ex-filtrate as much data as possible.   

A second type of attacks does not aim at the (human) user, but rather exploits software vulnerabilities. What is commonly known as malware, for instance, is nothing else than a pre-packaged exploitation of a software vulnerability. A new generation of malware aims to take control of whole networks of computers, creating what has become known as "botnets". Botnets, in turn, can be used in Distributed Denial of Service attacks, the type of attack Estonian state websites witnessed in the 2000s. Those kind of attacks target for instance web servers, with the goal to overwhelm them with the sheer amount of incoming requests.

Computer defense. The first part of the book also discusses different types of computer defense. Anti-virus programs usually consist of pre-packed solutions to malware whose traits have already been analyzed. Firewalls attempt to create a barrier between the different parts of a computer system, attempting to shield off the more sensitive areas. Intrusion detection systems aim to detect anomalous behavior associated with a cyber-attack. Finally, so-called "air gaps" designate the physical separation between a network and critical systems.

Why it matters?

In the second part of the book, Singer and Friedman discuss the strategic implications of the emergence of a cyber realm in international relations.
Nature of cyber-attacks. The defining difference between cyber and other types of attack is that they are digital in both means and targets. As argued by Singer and Friedman, this explains the other fundamental differences between cyber and other means of attack: cyber attacks are for instance harder to attribute, their effects are harder to predict, and costs are more related to research and development rather than to the components of actual weapon. Especially the attribution problem distinguishes cyber warfare from other types of attacks. Malware can take control of other users' computers. 25% of computers used in a Russian-sourced attack in Estonia in 2007 were for instance based in the United States. Another dimension of the attribution problem relates to so-called "patriotic hackers"- non-state groups employed by states to conduct cyber attacks on their behalf. The book provides an interesting discussion of the advantages and disadvantages patriotic hackers pose for the authoritarian states using them: while patriotic hackers allow those states to deny responsibility, governments such as the Russian or Chinese ones also have less control over them than they desire.

Range of cyber attacks. The book's second part also aims to introduce the reader to the issues of cyber crime- does it have the scale necessary to seriously threaten systems such as online banking- cyber espionage- currently controversial due to the theft of intellectual property by Chinese hackers, and cyber-terrorism- with attacks too difficult to pull off on a larger scale, but terrorist groups exploiting cyber space for networking and transferring knowledge. 

Legal dimensions of cyber attacks. In their discussion of the ethical and legal dimensions of cyber warfare, Singer and Friedman  point out that, like other forms of warfare, cyber war must follow the principles of proportionality and discrimination. Also, in order to count as an act of war, a cyber attack must have had effects which go beyond mere temporary disruption, and there must be a direct and measurable link between the cyber attack and those effects.

Military uses of cyber. Singer and Friedman elaborate on the various tactical uses cyber means may have in an armed confrontation: they may support the intelligence preparation of the battlefield; disrupt the opponent's command, control and communication networks; take control of the opponent's unmanned systems; target the computer systems running the enemy's military hardware such as ships or tanks; or deliberately target civilians.

Strategic implications of cyber. Cyber arms are a new and potentially disruptive weapons' technology and will likely have strategic implications. Central issues surrounding deterrence in cyberspace are the difficulty of attributing a cyber-attack to an originator and the issue of which level of force is appropriate to counter a cyber-attack. The attribution problem also makes signaling, a central component of the deterrence game, difficult. While stealthy and non-attributable cyber weapons are usually better for targeting an enemy's computer systems, they, due to their concealed nature, also make signaling one's own strength or resolve difficult.

A currently often discussed question is whether the growing importance of the cyber realm will reverse the current balance of power in world politics. The answer depends on whether the availability of the cyber realm as an additional realm of confrontation will strengthen weaker actors and whether it will favor offensive or defensive action. 
On one hand, barriers to entry for cyber weapons are low and major powers such as the United States are strongly reliant on computer systems. These factors should strengthen weaker and non-state actors in disputes. On the other hand, sophisticated cyber-attacks, especially when they aim for having actual physical effects beyond the information sphere, require significant economic and human resources which minor powers and non-state actors usually do not posses. 

Singer and Friedman paint a similarly picture is also quite nuanced regarding the offense defense balance in cyber-space. They dispute the argument that the offense dominates in the cyber domain because the exponential growth of information systems makes defending them increasingly difficult. Truly sophisticated cyber-attacks require a great deal of expertise and planning, making a disarming offensive first strike less likely than is commonly assumed. Moreover, the actual effects of a cyber-attack on a target remain hard to predict. Finally, a defender fearing a loss in the cyber domain has the option to escalate elsewhere, such as through diplomatic counter-measures.

Singer and Friedman also discuss issues of cyber proliferation and arms races. After their use, the technology behind cyber weapons such as stuxnet becomes publicly available, likely inspiring similar attacks. Drawing upon experiences from the cold war era, Singer and Friedman also argue that cyber arms races are unlikely to result in security gains for any of the actors involved. 

What can we do?

In the final part of the book, Singer and Friedman lay out various avenues to improve cyber security.

Cyber resilience. Singer and Friedman point to the importance of resilience, understood as organizations and systems which maintain functionality and control while under attack. The authors argue that there are three dimensions to this concept: computer systems must be able to work under degraded conditions; they must recover quickly; and they must learn lessons to deal with future threats. 

An international cyber regime. Friedman and Singer draw upon analogies to illustrate how an international cyber regime could develop. Specifically, they compare today's efforts to ensure internet security to the creation of the International Telegraph Union in the late 19th century and the historic fight against piracy. The high seas of the early modern age shared a variety of features with today's internet: nobody was capable of claiming complete control and state actors, state-sanctioned non-state actors, and private actors were all present. Moreover, while the sea and the cyber realm were/ are overwhelmingly used for communication and commerce, they are/ were also home to various nefarious and criminal activities. The global anti-piracy effort, as depicted by Singer and Friedman, largely relied on two lines of effort: attacking the markets and safe havens, such as pirate friendly islands in the Caribbean, which made piracy a profitable business and gradually building up a network of international treaties and norms directed against piracy.

One (promising) approach to developing an international regime against piracy, discussed by Singer and Friedman is so-called grafting strategy. The term, developed by political scientist Martha Finnemore, argues for the use of already existing international frameworks and areas of shared interests between major powers in order to gradually establish a rule-based international cyber order. Major powers could for instance begin to construct an international legal regime in the area of cyber crime, before gradually expanding their efforts towards more controversial issues.

Future trends

In their conclusion, Singer and Friedman discuss five major trends which will influence the cyber domain in general and cyber security in particular during years to come. Cloud computing allows users, be they individuals or organizations, to draw upon computing power and resources located outside their respective organizations. Big data designates the increasing ability to gather and analyze large and complex data-sets. As a result of the mobile revolution, the internet is increasingly used from mobile devices rather than home computers. The demography of internet users is shifting and increasingly includes non-Western users. Finally, the internet of things, brings with it the the dissolution of boundaries between the physical and the cyber domains. 

Random pop-cultural reference
The internet of things...

Men Down Under

Richard Flannagan: The Narrow Road to the Deep North

A book about an Australian prisoner of war forced by the Japanese to build a railway in Burma. Man Booker Prize winner 2014. The book is mostly worth the read, but still, I had a kind of rocky start with it.

Flannagan tells the story of Dorrigo Evans, an Australian Army surgeon during the second world war. Before the war, Dorrigo, an ambituous medic of modest background, becomes engaged with Ella, a woman from an upper-class family in Melbourne. However, he also begins a passionate affair with Amy, his uncle's young wife .

Having joined the Australian war effort, Dorrigo and his men get captured at Singapore, from where they are brought to the Burmese Jungle. There, the prisoners of war come under the supervision of the Japanese Major Nakamura. Nakamura, addicted to methamphetamines, is desperately trying to fulfill his emperor's will to build a railway, while facing an increasingly decimated workforce of Australian prisoners.  Even though he is treated preferentially by the Japanese as the highest ranking officer, Evans is still beloved by his men, trying to save as many of them as possible. Nevertheless, most of Dorrigo's subordinates die, be it of cholera, other diseases or of mistreatment by their captors.

The final part of the book is mostly devoted to the time after the war. Dorrigo returns to Australia. With him and Amy both thinking of each other as dead, Dorrigo gets married to Ella. Over the next decades, he leads a life of social and professional success and increasing recognition for his military service. At the same time, Evans becomes notoriously unfaithful towards his wife and memories of his time in the jungle continue to haunt him. Him and Amy are only to see each other once more by chance, but do not aim to arrange for a follow up encounter. Amy dies of cancer and Dorrigo in a traffic accident. 

The story of Dorrigo's life after the war is interspersed with the story of Major Nakamura. After the war, Nakamura struggles to survive in post war Japan, where he is wanted as a war criminal by the Americans. He, however, manages to assume a new identity, marries, and manages to re-establish himself professionally and socially. Nakamura, who is also never able to shed the memories of teh war, finally dies of cancer.

The book is very hard to get into, as it is very philosophical, almost a a bit pretentious in the beginning. As pointed out by a reviewer in the Guardian, Flannagan jumps from "past to present, from moment to moment, country to country, from woman's bed to woman's bed." The description of the life of the Australian prisoners and the Japanese atrocities which dominates the middle part of the novel is hard to swallow. At the same time, Flannagan does a good job at conveying the perspective of both the Japanese captors and the Australian prisoners. The final part which focuses on the various protagonists' lives after the war is both fascinating and touching. It also profits from Flannagan resorting to a more conventional narrative style. 

Favorite quotes:
"A happy man has no past, while an unhappy one has nothing else."

"I love being with people, Ella said. The more people I am with, Dorrigo thought, the more alone I feel."

"If they had spirit, Nakamura said, they would have chosen death rather than the shame of being a prisoner."

"Before, I worried how my men looked at me when I stood in front of them. But after, I just looked at them. That was enough." (A Japanese colonel talking about his first time beheading a prisoner).

"He felt he might fly apart into a million fragments were it not for her arms and body holding him." (Dorrigo about Amy)

"He lies and cheats and robs too, but for them, always for them. For he has come to love them, and every day he understands that he is failing in his love, for every day more and more of them die." 

"He refused to stop trying to help them live. He was not a good surgeon, he was not a good doctor; he was not, he believed in his heart, a good man. But he refused to stop trying."

(Dorrigo about his men in Burma) 

"They talked about fishing, food, winds and stonework; about growing tomatoes, keeping poultry and roasting lamb, catching crayfish and scallops; telling tales, jokes; the meaning of their stories nothing, the drift of them everything; the brittle and beautiful dream itself. It was hard to explain how good that fried fish and chips and cheap red wine felt inside them." (A reunion of the veterans after the war)

"....the army no longer the wild jaunt it had been with its defeats and victories and the living- the living!- constantly tearing anything established into ribbons, melting solid into air." (Dorrigo about post war career choices."

"His mind, in any case, he felt was a prison camp of horrors. He did not wish to give it any more weight than necessary."

"Jack and me. We didn't really know each other. i'm not sure if I liked everything about him. I suppose some things about me annoyed him. But I was the room and he was the note and now he is gone. And everything is silent." (A widow about her husband who died in Japanese captivity)

"And his life was now, he felt, one monumental unreality in which everything that did not matter- professional ambitions, the private pursuit of status, the colour of wallpaper, the size of an office or the matter of a dedicated car parking space- was vested with greatest significance, while everything that did matter- pleasure, joy, friendship, love- was deemed somehow peripheral. It made for dullness mostly and weirdness generally." (Dorrigo about his life after the war)

"As a meteorite strike long ago explains the large lake now, so Amy's absence shaped everything- even when- and sometimes most particularly when- Dorrigo wasn't thinking of her."

"In eighteen months- six more than she had been given- she would be burried in a suburban cemetery, an unremarkable lot amidst acres of similarly unremarkable graves. No one would ever see her again, and after a time even her nieces' memories would fade and then, like them also, finally be no more." (The last thing we are told about Amy)

Big Brother

George Orwell: 1984

And another classic. Great, great read and a shame to have missed out on it up to now. Thanks to the very special person who brought it to my attention.

The novel is set against the background of a system of totalitarian one party rule, in a world where the remaining three mega-states, Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia are in a permanent state of war. While ostensibly communist, Oceania is organized into a three-class society consisting of members of the inner party, the outer party and the proletariat. Winston Smith works in the Ministry of Truth, where he is tasked to adjust historical newspaper articles in line with the ruling party's ever changing version of reality. Smith despises the party, but continues to participate in its rituals which permeate every aspect of daily life. As a first act of resistance, he acquires a notebook and a pencil and begins to write a diary. He also falls in love with Julia, a co-worker at the Ministry of Truth. Together, they establish themselves a hideout in one of the proletarian quarters of London. When they attempt to join the resistance, their entire newly created reality turns out to be a set-up by the secret police, whose agents had apparently surrounded Winston and Julia since they beginning. They are arrested, tortured, betray each other and are finally released, broken and awaiting certain death at the hands of the party.

Overall, a masterpiece. The novel convincingly portrays the darkness of living in a totalitarian regime. What I found most interesting is the importance that control over the public narrative has for any authoritarian system. Speaking alternative facts... Equally scary is the idea, well portrayed by Orwell, that totalitarianism also aims at dissolving the social relations that are integral to human nature, such as the relations between lovers or parents and children. Finally, what came as the biggest shock to me when reading the novel was the absolute futility of resistance; the secret thought police seems to have been on the tracks of Winston and Julia since the very beginning.

Random pop cultural reference:
Alternative facts. What else. 

Favorite quotes:
"War is Peace; Freedom is Slavery; Ignorance is Strength."

"And if all others accepted the lie which the party imposed- if all records told the same thing- then the lie passed into history and became truth."

"What could you see to attract you in a man like me? 'It was something in your face. I thought I'd take a chance. I'm good at spotting people who don't belong."

"He wondered vaguely whether in the abolished past it had been normal experience to lie in bed like this, in the cool of a summer evening, a man and a woman with no clothes on, making love when they chose, talking of what they chose, not feeling any compulsion to get up, simply lying there and listening to peaceful sounds outside."

"To hang on from day to day and from week to week, spinning out a present that had no future, seemed an unconquerable instinct, just as one's lungs will always draw the next breath so long as there is air available."

"When once you were in the grip of the Party, what you felt or did not feel, what you did or refrained from doing, made literally no difference. Whatever happened, you vanished, and neither you nor your actions were ever heard of again."

"There is no possibility that any perceptible change will ever happen within our own lifetime. We are the dead. Our only true life is in the future."

"Reality exists in the human mind and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in the mind of the party which is collective and immortal."

"The command of the old despotisms was "Thou shalt not". The command of the totalitarians was "Thou shalt". Our command is "Thou art"."

Holy War

Thomas Hegghammer: Jihad in Saudi Arabia- Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979

This book about the evolution of jihadism in Saudi Arabia represents social science at its best.

Hegghammer sets out to explain mobilization for Islamic activism in its jihadist variant in Saudi Arabia. The book applies a threefold analytical approach, distinguishing between macro-, meso and micro-level mechanisms that drove the development of jihadism in Saudi Arabia. The macro-level comprises international developments, Saudi domestic politics and the development of the Jihadist ideational landscape. At the meso-level, Hegghammer focuses on jihadist entrepreneurs and their strategies for mobilization. Finally, in his investigation of the micro-level drivers of jihadist mobilization, Hegghammer examines individual combatant's socio-economic profiles and motivations.The three levels of analysis are, in turn, applied to the three stages of Saudi jihadism: A first phase from mid-1980s to mid-1990s saw the emergence of classical jihadism, a doctrine which developed out of "liberation" struggles in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya and argued that all Muslims had to fight against non-Muslim invaders of Muslim territory. A second phase saw the emergence of global jihadism under Bin Laden, who, argued for out of area mass casualty attacks against non-Muslim powers. In the third phase, Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) emerged in order to wage war against the Western presence in Saudi Arabia.

Classicial Jihadism 
A first chapter investigates the macro-level mechanisms behind the spread of classical jihadism. A central factor was the rise of Pan-Islamism, i.e. the idea of Muslims as one people. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi King Faisal promoted pan-Islamism in an attempt to shore up the domestic legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy during a times of Iranian challenge and sinking oil prices. The Muslim World League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, both organizations created as Saudi initiatives, assumed central roles in furthering the pan-Islamic cause. Pan-Islamism also increasingly assumed a security dimension in the late 70s and 80s, triggered by the increase in conflicts in Muslim countries.
Chapter 2 moves to the meso level of classical jihadism. Hegghammer points to the importance of Abdallah Azzam's reformulation of Jihadist doctrine, which, based on the case of Afghanistan, redefined jihad in territorial struggles against non-Muslim invaders as a collective duty for all Muslims. During this period, an organizational blueprint to facilitate jihadism was developed in Afghanistan: The Services Bureau provided a separate infrastructure for Arab fighters and systematically worked with the media and through Muslim charities. A similar formula was later applied in Bosnia and Chechnya.
Chapter 3 investigates the micro dimension of classical jihadism, i.e. the question of who got recruited for what reason to join the jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Chechnya. Hegghammer's central finding is that neither socio-economic indicators nor ideology were good predictors for why individuals decided to join, but rather friendship, kinship ties and the social experience of joining jihad.

Global Jihadism
Chapter 4 investigates the opportunity structure for global jihadism between 1996 and 2001. A central precursor for the radicalization of the Saudi Islamist scene was the oppression of the Sahwa movement in the early 1990s. The Sahwa is a non-violent reformist movement merging Wahhabist ideology with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi state oppression of the Sahwa led to the loss of a part of the clergy which could rein in the more radical jihadist elements, The vacuum  was partially filled by the al-Shu'yabi school of clerics, who increasingly provided Wahhabi religious legitimacy for jihadist activism. Moreover, repression of the Sahwa also convinced Jihadists of the futility of non-violent protest, and ultimately resulted in the 1995 Ryadh bombing against US military contractors. The Saudi state enhanced, but also inconsistent repression, which followed the attack only furthered the radicalization of a generation of militants. All this took place against the opportunity structure offered by international conflicts in Kosovo, Cechnya, the Palestinian intifada, and increasing tensions between the Taliban and the West.
Chapter 5 examines the meso-level of Al Quaida's development in Saudi Arabia. The doctrine of global jihadism as formulated by Osama Bin Laden foresaw global warfare against the "far enemy" (the United States). Hegghammer argues that in spite of this doctrine being much more controversial than classical jihadism, Bin Laden still managed to aquire military capabilities out of proportion to his actual support base in Saudi Arabia. The central factor were safe havens in Afghanistan, allowing Al Quaida to provide its recruits professional military training.
Turning to the micro-level once more, Hegghammer examines in Chapter 6  the motivations among Saudis that joined the jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Recruitment in Saudi Arabia at that time had to be done mostly underground, which increased the importance of gatekeepers, individuals in Saudi Arabia who could provide a link to Al Qaida in Afghanistan. This function was taken over by private recruiters, religious study groups, and sheiks. Individual motives for joining during this period remained diverse, ranging from religious reasons to the quest for adventure.

Post 9/11 Jihadism.
Chapter 7 details the macro-level mechanisms which drove the mobilization and recruitment for Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula. After the 09/ 11 attacks, pan-Islamist sentiment reached new heights, motivated by perceived symbols of Muslim suffering in Afghanistan, Yemen and Guantanamo. The al-Shu'yabi school of clerics (including notably Nasir al-Fahd and al-Khudayir) also proved to be a central factor in recruitment and mobilization for AQAP. Those clerics did so directly, by religiously justifying the killing of Westerners in Saudi Arabia and of Saudi Security Forces, but also indirectly, by driving the Saudi Security Forces to adopt a more confrontational stance against AQAP.
Chapter 8 investigates the meso or organizational level.of AQAP activities in Saudi Arabia after 2001. For AQ, having been evicted from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia became more attractive as a theater of operations and less useful as a source of money and recruits. Bin Laden thus saw the time to have come to begin the campaign against the foreign presence in Saudi Arabia, sending two major terrorist networks into action. While the al-Nashiri network was largely dismantled by Saudi counter-terrorism efforts, the al-Ayeri network was able to engage in a strategy of systematic organization-building. Hegghammer describes the network's information and propaganda efforts, an infrastructure for recruitment, a training infrastructure, weapons, money and safe houses. AQAP, or mostly the al-Ayeri network, finally launched its campaign in spring 2013.
Chapter 9 investigates the biographies of people involved in the AQAP campaign between 2002 and 2006, taking the analysis once more to the micro-level of terrorist recruitment. A clear common denominator of most Saudi jihadis during this period was the shared Afghan experience which also explained their problems to reintegrate into Saudi society. As for their motivations for joining, anti-Americanism played a more important role than for previous generations of Jihadists, but comradeship, revenge and fear of security forces also figured prominently. Hegghammer outlines three mechanisms which brought Saudis into AQAP: persuasion- AQAP activists persuading others to join in, incrimination- people becoming unknowingly incriminated through their association with AQAP members- and protection- people joining in search of protection from the police.
Chapter 10 deals with the petering out of the AQAP campaign after 2010, essentially identifying 3 different factors:  the effectiveness of Saudi counter-terrorism, the lack of popular support, and the popular appeal of joining a classical jihad in Iraq rather than fighting in the Saudi homeland. Regarding Saudi counter-terrorism, Hegghammer describes the complete overhaul of the Saudi counter-terrorism apparatus, the circumscription of AQAP's resources, the creation of exit options for militants, and a religious propaganda campaign directed at the hearts and minds of the Saudi Islamist community.

Overall, area studies meets social science at its best. Hegghammer manages to combine a rigorous conceptual framework with well-researched evidence on jihadism in the Arab peninsula, based on primary sources. Plus, the whole book at points almost reads like a thriller. Highly recommended.

When a man loves a woman

Haruki Murakami: Men without Women

A collection of short stories. About, well, men without women. The German translation is already available, the English one out in May 2017. Great stuff.

• Kafaku, a widowed actor, has lost his driver's licence and is relying on a young female driver, Misaki. He begins telling how he started meeting his deceased wife's lover to talk about his late spouse.

• Kitaru, a young Japanese studying to be admitted to university, asks his friend Tanimura to take out his long-term girlfriend Erika for a date. On the date, Erika explains the problem of being together with somebody one has known all life long. A couple of weeks later, Kitaru disappears. Sixteen years later, Erika and Tanimura meet again. It turns out Kitaru left Tokyo and later Japan after Erika had had an affair with another man.

• Dr. Tokai, a middle-aged succesful plastic surgeon and happy bachelor, has been together with dozens of women, but never with a serious intention to get married. When he finally falls in love with a woman, this sets in motion a process of physical and psychological decline.

• For reasons that are not discussed, Habara is unable to leave the house he is staying in. His only contact to the outside world is a nurse, Scheherazade, who regularly comes to visit him, sleeps with him, and tells him stories.

• Kino, freshly separated from his wife, takes over an aunt's cafe and turns it into a bar. After a couple of surreal events, he temporarily closes the bar and heads for a journey in search of himself through various Japanese cities.

• In a short story clearly inspired by Franz Kafka, a man wakes up in bed barely capable of moving, having been turned into "Gregor Samsa". He finds himself on his own in a large house in a city that seems to be a war zone. A camel-backed woman comes by to repair a defunct lock. Samsa discovers the new emotion of being attracted by the woman.

• A  final short story turns around a man reflecting on a former girlfriend after receiving a phone call informing that the latter has committed suicide.

A great collection, covering the entire range of Murakami's story-telling, from realist (think Norwegian Wood) to surrealist (think Wind-Up Bird Chronicle). Told in his typically minimalist language, Murakami once more succeeds in creating the magic characteristic of his work. 

Random movie reference.

Men without women.... Steeeeella.

Favorite quotes:

Will leave that one to the translator.

How to make a state. Or not.

Francis Fukuyama: Political Order and Political Decay

The second volume of Fukuyama's magisterial work on political development, this time covering the time period since the French revolution. Must read, even though it is slightly weaker than the first volume.

Fukuyama sets out to provide an update to Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies. Huntington argued against modernization theory by making the case that different dimensions of development do not necessarily go together. On the contrary, social mobilization resulting from economic modernization may cause new political demands which cannot be accommodated by the political institutions in place. Disorder and violent conflict may be the result.

In the Origins of Political Order, Fukuyama introduced four dimensions of development: social mobilization; economic development; the development of ideas about legitimacy; and political development. Political development, in turn, includes state-building, the rule of law, and democratic accountability. As for state-building, humankind has seen a transition from band-level societies (based on genetic relatives) over tribal societies (based on shared ancestry) to state-based societies. A central step towards modern states is the transition from a patrimonial system- where friends and relatives of the ruler staff important offices- to impersonal bureaucratic rule. The central obstacle to building modern states are the natural human tendencies for kin selection (altruism increases in proportion to the number of genes shared) and reciprocal altruism (the exchange of favors between non-related individuals). The second dimension of political development, the rule of law, has its origins in religious institutions which were charged with interpreting religious texts and were independent of the state. Finally, Origins of Political Order demonstrates how democratic accountability arose (in Europe) out of the conflict between the monarch and the estates.

The first part of Political Order and Political Decay is devoted to state-building (1). Historically, patrimonalism has been overcome in one of two ways: military competition increasing the need for tax revenue which leads to the professionalization of the bureaucracy; or reform coalitions pushing for efficient and un-corrupt administrations. Fukuyama conducts several case studies of state-building. Democratization before the establishment of a strong administration led to pervasive clientelism in Greece, Italy, Britain and the U.S., while the establishment of a modern bureaucracy by a strong authoritarian state, driven by military competition, proved enduring in Prussia/ Germany. Coalitions which ultimately reformed clientelistic states emerged in UK and the US, but not in the low-trust societies of Greece and Southern Italy (2).

In a separate chapter, Fukuyama goes on to establish the distinction between state-building with its focus on tangible institutions from nation-building focused on creation of a sense of national identity. Nation-building is usually achieved through one of four processes: moving borders to fit national identities; moving or eliminating populations to create homogeneous political units; cultural assimilation of identities into the dominant national culture; and adjusting national identities to fit political realities.

The second part of the book deals with political development in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Existing theories of political development point to climate, geography, population density, and different experiences with colonialization as explanatory factors. Higher population densities spur specialization and technological progress, which in turn sets the ground for the development of modern states. Inhabitable flat and open land allows states to project military power and establish a monopoly of force; geographic circumscription prevents tribal units from simply moving away from a centralized political authority exerting pressure on them. Hospitable climates allow for colonial settlement and state-building rather than merely extractive rule. Fukuyama draws upon these theories and shows how the different factors interacted in driving political development on the three continents (3).

Part 3 of the book discusses the origins and spread of democracy. Fukuyama, drawing upon the works of Karl Marx and Barrington Moore "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", focusses on economic development and social mobilization as the major explanatory factors. Historically, democracy emerged where a growing middle class displaced an old order dominated by landowners and the peasantry. Democratic consolidation in turn, depends on the positioning of the middle class, which often turns against democratic institutions when it feels threatened by the working class or poorer segments of the population demanding redistribution.

In part 4, Fukuyama deals with the decay of political institutions. Decay usually constitutes a failure to adapt institutions to new circumstances. It occurs in the form of “repatrimonialization” with insiders capturing previously impersonal state institutions, as the natural human tendencies of kin selection and reciprocal altruism come to the fore once more. It can be the result of the cognitive rigidity of elites or of their lacking interest in change. Change can be blocked by elites due to their superior access to resources and information.  

Fukuyama focusses his empirical discussion of political decay on the U.S. The central problem identified by Fukyama is the lack of legislative coherence. Administrative decision-making my either be excessively constrained, or there may be too generous delegations of authority. Fukuyama points to a variety of drivers. First, functions which are handled by administrative bureaucracies in other countries are increasingly taken over by the courts in the US. This leads to costly litigation, slow decision-making and inconsistent law enforcement. Second, Fukuyama argues that interest group influence on Congress has become excessive. This in turn, leads to Congress designing complex and often contradictory mandates for administrative agencies. Third, the US system of checks and balances brings a significant number of veto players with it, providing interest groups with multiple avenues of influence.

Overall, Origins of Political Order and Political Order and Political Decay should be must-read for anybody interested in politics or the development of political institutions. The wealth of empirical material covered in this opus magnum is nothing less than impressive. On the theoretical side, Fukuyama stands be commended for avoiding a mono-causal approach in explaining political development. Instead the careful consideration of path dependence and the interaction of various explanatory factors stand out. This contrasts nicely with for instance Acemoglou and Robinson’s attempt in Why Nations Fail to attribute economic development to a single political variable, the inclusiveness of a countries’ political institutions.

Still, the second volume did not convince me as much as the first one did. While Fukuyama provides great insights on state and nation-building since the French revolution, Political Decay has much less to say on the development of the rule of law and political accountability. Moreover, the book's treatment of political decay struck me as unexpectedly weak. Above all, Fukuyama does not employ a consistent definition and measurement of what he means by political decay. The conceptualization of decay as the repatrimonialization of political institutions which Fukuyama introduces in the beginning of Part 4 does not really feature in his case study of  the United States. Instead, he seems to define political decay as different parts of the U.S. administration having either too much or too little autonomy due to complex legislative mandates. Moreover, as Fukuyama does not offer an empirical measure of the kind of political decay he is interested in, it remains unclear to what degree the US system is really in a state of decay, both from a temporal and from a cross-national perspective.

Nevertheless, in spite of these quips, the book remains an absolute must-read. Moreover, both volumes are also so rich when it comes to theoretical concepts about political development that there is hope that they will inspire a lot of empirical research in the years to come.

Random movie reference:
Political decay and the Simpsons...

(1)   In order to be able to better understand obstacles towards state-building, Fukuyama introduces the concepts of corruption, rents, patronage and clientelism. Corruption is defined as the appropriation of public resources for private gains; Rents as the difference between production costs and a good's price; patronage as the reciprocal exchange between individuals of different status/ power; clientelism as the large-scale exchange of favors and individualized benefits (e.g. public good, public sector jobs) for votes through political machines.

(2)  With full male suffrage in 1864, Greece became one of the first full electoral democracies in Europe. However, a capable state had not been established at this point. This led to a clientelistic system of government. A variety of factors prevented the emergence of a reformist coalition. First, Greece has a tradition of foreign influence and colonialization, which has led to enormous distrust of government. Greek society is consequently focused on kinship ties rather than reforming the state. Moreover, economic modernization in Greece occurred largely without industrial development. While urbanization took place, it consequently just transplanted the patron client relationships that were prevalent in rural areas into an urban context. State employment distributed by political patrons came to be a major source of income for the new urban population, who consequently did not develop an interest to disrupt the status quo.

      Clientelism also remains pervasive in Southern Italy. Like Greece, Southern Italy also witnessed modernization without industrialization; the newly emergent middle class was mainly keen on joining the land-owning oligarchy rather than creating a reformist coalition. A low-trust society has perpetuated itself in Southern Italy, which has been promoted by the rise of organized crime performing certain state functions.

      In the UK, administrative reform was driven by the 1854 report of the Northcote-      Trevelayn commission to parliament which proposed, among others, merit based recruitment and the splitting of clerical duties from higher administrative functions. The report had been driven by the demands of intellectuals and the media in the aftermath of Crimean war. The relatively swift implementation of the report’s was facilitated by the low number of veto players in a Westminster system of government.

      In the U.S. the dismantling of a clientelistic system of party government and the establishment of a professional bureaucracy process was a slower process which took place between 1880 and the 1920s. The roots of administrative reform lie in the 1883 Pendleton Act, which established a (“classified”) merit-based part in the administration, where positions were no longer the prerogative of parties or congress. Driving factors in this process of administrative reform were middle class and business interests, social reformers, and the Republican Party. 

(3)  In Latin America, pre-existing state institutions were eradicated by the Spanish and the Portuguese and supplanted by oligarchic, class-based governments exploiting indigenous labor. The colonizers did not leave a legacy of strong institutions, as geography made military power projection difficult, population densities were not high enough to support the building of powerful states, and economic surpluses in the colonies were not reinvested but exported home. This left a legacy of highly unequal societies and sharp polarization. Moreover, the newly created Latin American states largely lacked national identities based on a joint language or shared ethnicity. From the 19^th century on, the newly independent Latin American states did not experience events akin to the French revolution or the intense interstate warfare which facilitated state and nation-building in Europe. Instead, most states in Latin America were marred by internal conflicts reflecting social divisions and inviting continued interventions by external powers.

Sub-Saharan Africa had not yet made the transition from tribal to state-level societies when encountering Western colonizers in the 19^th century. This lack of strong state-societies can be explained by low population densities, the lack of inhabitable and open, but at the same time geographically conscribed land, and the often inhospitable climate. As a result, the European powers colonizing Africa relied on indirect rule through local proxies instead of building modern state institutions. Moreover, national identity remained weak with the European mainly replacing tribalism with ethnicity rather than engaging in nation-building. The result were neopatrimonial regimes whose defining features are personalism centered around a president or “big man”, pervasive clientelism, and weak state institutions

Fukuyama’s discussion of political development in East Asia focuses on China and Japan. Both countries already had strong state institutions and national identities before their encounters with the Western world. Leaders, often influenced by Confucian ideals, could thus draw upon strong bureaucracies to modernize their countries’ economies. A difference between East Asian and in East Asia that the development of strong state institutions preceded the establishment rule of law, which resulted in a state-society balance tilted very much towards the state. Unlike in other parts of the world, the major political issue in Asia has thus not been state weakness, but how to restrain states.