The second volume of Fukuyama's magisterial work
on political development, this time covering the time period since the French revolution. Must read, even though it is slightly
weaker than the first volume.
Fukuyama sets out to provide an update to Samuel
Huntington's Political Order in Changing
Societies. Huntington argued
against modernization theory by making the case that different dimensions of development
do not necessarily go together. On the contrary, social mobilization resulting
from economic modernization may cause new political demands which cannot be
accommodated by the political institutions in place. Disorder and violent
conflict may be the result.
In the Origins of Political Order, Fukuyama introduced four dimensions of development: social mobilization;
economic development; the development of ideas about legitimacy; and political
development. Political development, in turn, includes state-building, the rule
of law, and democratic accountability. As for state-building, humankind
has seen a transition from band-level societies (based on genetic relatives)
over tribal societies (based on shared ancestry) to state-based societies. A central
step towards modern states is the transition from a patrimonial system- where
friends and relatives of the ruler staff important offices- to impersonal
bureaucratic rule. The central obstacle to building modern states are the natural
human tendencies for kin selection (altruism increases in proportion to the
number of genes shared) and reciprocal altruism (the exchange of favors between
non-related individuals). The second dimension of political development, the rule
of law, has its origins in religious institutions which were charged with interpreting
religious texts and were independent of the state. Finally, Origins of Political Order demonstrates
how democratic accountability arose (in Europe) out of the conflict between the
monarch and the estates.
The first part of Political Order and Political Decay is devoted to state-building (1). Historically, patrimonalism
has been overcome in one of two ways: military competition increasing the need
for tax revenue which leads to the professionalization of the bureaucracy; or
reform coalitions pushing for efficient and un-corrupt administrations.
Fukuyama conducts several case studies of state-building. Democratization before the establishment of a strong administration led to
pervasive clientelism in Greece, Italy, Britain and the U.S., while the
establishment of a modern bureaucracy by a strong authoritarian state, driven
by military competition, proved enduring in Prussia/ Germany. Coalitions which
ultimately reformed clientelistic states emerged in UK and the US, but not in the
low-trust societies of Greece and Southern Italy (2).
In a separate chapter, Fukuyama goes on to
establish the distinction between state-building with its focus on tangible
institutions from nation-building focused on creation of a sense of national
identity. Nation-building is usually achieved through one of four processes:
moving borders to fit national identities; moving or eliminating populations to
create homogeneous political units; cultural assimilation of identities into
the dominant national culture; and adjusting national identities to fit
political realities.
The second part of the book deals with political
development in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
Existing theories of political development point to climate, geography, population
density, and different experiences with colonialization as explanatory factors.
Higher population densities spur specialization and technological progress,
which in turn sets the ground for the development of modern states. Inhabitable
flat and open land allows states to project military power and establish a
monopoly of force; geographic circumscription prevents tribal units from simply
moving away from a centralized political authority exerting pressure on them. Hospitable
climates allow for colonial settlement and state-building rather than merely
extractive rule. Fukuyama draws upon these theories and shows how the different
factors interacted in driving political development on the three continents (3).
Part 3 of the book discusses the origins and
spread of democracy. Fukuyama, drawing upon the works of Karl Marx and
Barrington Moore "Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy", focusses on economic development and
social mobilization as the major explanatory factors. Historically, democracy
emerged where a growing middle class displaced an old order dominated by landowners
and the peasantry. Democratic consolidation in turn, depends on the positioning
of the middle class, which often turns against democratic institutions when it
feels threatened by the working class or poorer segments of the population
demanding redistribution.
In part 4, Fukuyama deals with the decay of
political institutions. Decay usually constitutes a failure to adapt institutions
to new circumstances. It occurs in the form of “repatrimonialization” with
insiders capturing previously impersonal state institutions, as the natural
human tendencies of kin selection and reciprocal altruism come to the fore once
more. It can be the result of the cognitive rigidity of elites or of their
lacking interest in change. Change can be blocked by elites due to their superior
access to resources and information.
Fukuyama focusses his empirical discussion of
political decay on the U.S. The central problem identified by Fukyama is the lack
of legislative coherence. Administrative decision-making my either be excessively
constrained, or there may be too generous delegations of authority. Fukuyama
points to a variety of drivers. First, functions which are handled by
administrative bureaucracies in other countries are increasingly taken over by
the courts in the US. This leads to costly litigation, slow decision-making and
inconsistent law enforcement. Second, Fukuyama argues that interest group
influence on Congress has become excessive. This in turn, leads to Congress designing
complex and often contradictory mandates for administrative agencies. Third, the
US system of checks and balances brings a significant number of veto players
with it, providing interest groups with multiple avenues of influence.
Overall, Origins
of Political Order and Political
Order and Political Decay should be must-read for anybody interested in politics
or the development of political institutions. The wealth of empirical material
covered in this opus magnum is nothing less than impressive. On the theoretical
side, Fukuyama stands be commended for avoiding a mono-causal approach in
explaining political development. Instead the careful consideration of path
dependence and the interaction of various explanatory factors stand out. This
contrasts nicely with for instance Acemoglou and Robinson’s attempt in Why Nations Fail to
attribute economic development to a single political variable, the
inclusiveness of a countries’ political institutions.
Still, the second volume did not convince me as
much as the first one did. While Fukuyama provides great insights on state and
nation-building since the French revolution, Political Decay has much less to
say on the development of the rule of law and political accountability. Moreover, the book's treatment of political decay struck me as unexpectedly weak. Above all, Fukuyama
does not employ a consistent definition and measurement of what he means by political
decay. The conceptualization of decay as the repatrimonialization of political
institutions which Fukuyama introduces in the beginning of Part 4 does not
really feature in his case study of the United States. Instead,
he seems to define political decay as different parts of the U.S.
administration having either too much or too little autonomy due to complex
legislative mandates. Moreover, as Fukuyama does not offer an empirical measure
of the kind of political decay he is interested in, it remains unclear to what
degree the US system is really in a state of decay, both from a temporal and from a cross-national perspective.
Nevertheless, in spite of these quips, the book
remains an absolute must-read. Moreover, both volumes are also so rich when it
comes to theoretical concepts about political development that there is hope
that they will inspire a lot of empirical research in the years to come.
Political decay and the Simpsons...
(1)
In order to be able to
better understand obstacles towards state-building, Fukuyama introduces the
concepts of corruption, rents, patronage and clientelism. Corruption is defined
as the appropriation of public resources for private gains; Rents as the
difference between production costs and a good's price; patronage as the
reciprocal exchange between individuals of different status/ power; clientelism
as the large-scale exchange of favors and individualized benefits (e.g. public
good, public sector jobs) for votes through political machines.
(2) With full male suffrage in 1864, Greece became one of the first full electoral democracies in Europe. However, a capable state had not been established at this point. This led to a clientelistic system of government. A variety of factors prevented the emergence of a reformist coalition. First, Greece has a tradition of foreign influence and colonialization, which has led to enormous distrust of government. Greek society is consequently focused on kinship ties rather than reforming the state. Moreover, economic modernization in Greece occurred largely without industrial development. While urbanization took place, it consequently just transplanted the patron client relationships that were prevalent in rural areas into an urban context. State employment distributed by political patrons came to be a major source of income for the new urban population, who consequently did not develop an interest to disrupt the status quo.
Clientelism also remains pervasive in Southern Italy. Like Greece, Southern Italy also witnessed modernization without industrialization; the newly emergent middle class was mainly keen on joining the land-owning oligarchy rather than creating a reformist coalition. A low-trust society has perpetuated itself in Southern Italy, which has been promoted by the rise of organized crime performing certain state functions.
In the UK, administrative reform was driven by the 1854 report of the Northcote- Trevelayn commission to parliament which proposed, among others, merit based recruitment and the splitting of clerical duties from higher administrative functions. The report had been driven by the demands of intellectuals and the media in the aftermath of Crimean war. The relatively swift implementation of the report’s was facilitated by the low number of veto players in a Westminster system of government.
In the U.S. the dismantling of a clientelistic system of party government and the establishment of a professional bureaucracy process was a slower process which took place between 1880 and the 1920s. The roots of administrative reform lie in the 1883 Pendleton Act, which established a (“classified”) merit-based part in the administration, where positions were no longer the prerogative of parties or congress. Driving factors in this process of administrative reform were middle class and business interests, social reformers, and the Republican Party.
(3) In Latin America, pre-existing state institutions were eradicated by the Spanish and the Portuguese and supplanted by oligarchic, class-based governments exploiting indigenous labor. The colonizers did not leave a legacy of strong institutions, as geography made military power projection difficult, population densities were not high enough to support the building of powerful states, and economic surpluses in the colonies were not reinvested but exported home. This left a legacy of highly unequal societies and sharp polarization. Moreover, the newly created Latin American states largely lacked national identities based on a joint language or shared ethnicity. From the 19th century on, the newly independent Latin American states did not experience events akin to the French revolution or the intense interstate warfare which facilitated state and nation-building in Europe. Instead, most states in Latin America were marred by internal conflicts reflecting social divisions and inviting continued interventions by external powers.
Sub-Saharan Africa had not yet made the transition from tribal to state-level societies when encountering Western colonizers in the 19th century. This lack of strong state-societies can be explained by low population densities, the lack of inhabitable and open, but at the same time geographically conscribed land, and the often inhospitable climate. As a result, the European powers colonizing Africa relied on indirect rule through local proxies instead of building modern state institutions. Moreover, national identity remained weak with the European mainly replacing tribalism with ethnicity rather than engaging in nation-building. The result were neopatrimonial regimes whose defining features are personalism centered around a president or “big man”, pervasive clientelism, and weak state institutions
Fukuyama’s discussion of political development in East Asia focuses on China and Japan. Both countries already had strong state institutions and national identities before their encounters with the Western world. Leaders, often influenced by Confucian ideals, could thus draw upon strong bureaucracies to modernize their countries’ economies. A difference between East Asian and in East Asia that the development of strong state institutions preceded the establishment rule of law, which resulted in a state-society balance tilted very much towards the state. Unlike in other parts of the world, the major political issue in Asia has thus not been state weakness, but how to restrain states.
